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Masking the Reemergence of Immutability
with “Outcomes for Children”
Ginger Grimes*
The 2014 Michigan trial DeBoer v. Snyder involved a challenge
to a 2004 voter initiative amending the state’s constitution to ban same-sex
marriage. DeBoer was one of four consolidated cases from the Sixth
Circuit granted certiorari to the Supreme Court in January 2015, known
collectively as Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme
Court handed down its historic decision in Obergefell, requiring states to
license marriages between two people of the same sex and to recognize
marriages between two people of the same sex when their marriage was
lawfully licensed out of state. Obergefell has thus left open the opportunity
for litigation over whether sexual orientation-based classifications warrant
heightened scrutiny. Same-sex-marriage-ban defenders in DeBoer had
argued that because marriage often involves children and children learn from
their parents, same-sex parents provide a less than ideal environment for
children based on the impact of the parents’ sexual orientation on their
children. The defenders argue that this impact leads to poorer “outcomes for
children.” The debate over marriage equality therefore became a question of
whether same-sex parents reproduce their own gender and sexual orientation
identities onto their children; in other words, the debate becomes a question
of the immutability of such traits. This debate is characterized as a
“distraction” because courts no longer recognize immutability as a dispositive
factor in an Equal Protection level-of-scrutiny analysis. This Note argues
that children are the unique condition that allows the debate about
immutability to resurface in the context of purported governmental interests.
This Note then concludes with a warning for advocates to be aware of this
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trap and redirect the debate to normative questions about gender, sexuality,
and sexual orientation.
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INTRODUCTION
Now, your Honor, I’m sure you’re thinking, counsel, what about the recent decisions
in Utah and Virginia and Oklahoma, why shouldn’t this case turn out any different?
My response to you, your Honor, is unfortunately those courts lost sight of the proper
standard. They forgot who should define marriage.
....
But even more notable is that none of these three decisions challenged the premise that
it’s beneficial for a child to have both a mom and a dad. Instead, in those cases the courts
claim that point would not justify excluding same sex couples.1
Equal protection challenges to laws distinguishing a class of persons defined
by their sexual orientation have become increasingly common over the last two
decades. Courts’ understanding of sexual orientation in this context has evolved to
a point of settlement: sexual orientation is viewed as so integral to a person’s identity
that it is not appropriate to require an individual to change his or her orientation in
order to avoid discriminatory treatment.2 The immutability of sexual orientation is
therefore relevant but not dispositive in an Equal Protection level-of-scrutiny
analysis. Although diverging on the level of protection warranted by sexual
orientation-based classifications, courts have generally agreed that they need not

1. Transcript of Record, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 48, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich.
2014) (No. 12-10285).
2. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008).
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decide whether a person’s sexual orientation is immutable in order to afford
protections to sexual orientation-based classes.3
The debate over immutability, however, has reemerged in the context of LGB4
parenting. Ironically, the debate has reemerged in the very same cases in which
immutability is sidelined in regard to whether sexual orientation deserves heightened
scrutiny. The focus has shifted to the strength of the government’s purported
interest in discriminatory marriage laws rather than the level of scrutiny for the
classification. Whether LGB identity can or should be transmitted from parent to
child—a question that ultimately pertains to the immutability of such an identity—
is framed as a debate over the impact of parents’ sexual orientation on “outcomes
for children.”5 On one side of the debate, gay-rights advocates argue that social
scientists and organizations specializing in the psychiatric and emotional well-being
of children generally agree on the “No Difference Consensus”—the notion that
there is no difference between outcomes for children of same-sex parents and
children of opposite-sex parents.6 On the other side, traditional-marriage defenders
and opponents of same-sex parenting argue that the social science on outcomes for
children is too new and unsettled to create a dispositive answer to the debate, and
that studies repeatedly show that an intact marital family with a mother and a father
provides the ideal environment for children.7 Although not made in explicit terms,
the arguments offered for and against LGB parental rights allow the debate over
immutability to resurface. This has occurred through the abstraction of “outcomes,”
which are measured in part by a child’s gender expression,8 gender identity,9 and
understanding of his or her own sexuality.

3. For example, in 2012, a federal district court in Nevada granted a defendant’s motion to
dismiss a complaint challenging Nevada’s prohibition of same-sex marriage in its constitution and
statutory law. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1021 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Latta v. Otter,
771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). The decisions in In re Marriage Cases and Kerrigan fell on the opposite side
of the fight for LGB rights than the court in Sevcik, yet all courts agreed that they did not need to issue
a final ruling on the mutability of sexual orientation identity. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384; Kerrigan,
957 A.2d 407.
4. In this Note, I will use “LGB” to describe the sexual orientation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
parents. While gender nonconforming and trans identities are certainly relevant to the topic of
parenting, I limit my analysis in this Note to the impact of sexual orientation identity on outcomes for
children.
5. There have been numerous amicus briefs submitted on behalf of pro-gay plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Brief for American Psychological Association, et al. Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees at 33–34,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
6. See, e.g., Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?
66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 163 (2001) (arguing that most research in psychology concludes that there are
no differences in developmental outcomes between children raised by lesbian and gay parents and
children raised by straight parents).
7. See, e.g., Brief of Social Science Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13–28,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
8. Gender expression is “how a person outwardly expresses their gender.” An Ally’s Guide to
Terminology, GLAAD & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (2012), available at www.glaad.org/
sites/default/files/allys-guide-to-terminology_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7FT-XLH6].
9. Gender identity is “one’s internal sense of gender.” Id.
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This Note analyzes the recent Michigan trial DeBoer v. Snyder,10 which
highlights the reemergence of the debate over the immutability of sexual
orientation. DeBoer involved a challenge to a 2004 voter initiative amending
Michigan’s Constitution to ban same-sex marriage.11 The opening epigraph of this
Note, taken from opening statements by counsel for State Defendants, signals the
unique focus of this trial on expert testimony as a means to determine whether the
ban on same-sex marriage is justified by differences in outcomes for children. This
Note examines the arguments made in DeBoer concerning the legitimacy of the
available social science on LGB parenting and outcomes for children. It situates
these arguments within the larger frameworks of same-sex marriage, LGB
parenting, and sexual orientation identity.
Part I details the development of Equal Protection jurisprudence surrounding
sexual-orientation-based classifications and the settlement of immutability as a
nondispositive factor. This background serves as a point of comparison for the
argument that the reemergence of the immutability debate is a red herring,
distracting us from the legal, social, and political debate over normative questions
about sexual variation.
Part II summarizes the substantive arguments made in DeBoer. This Part
involves a close reading of the expert testimony put forth by each side. It lays out
state rationales for same-sex marriage prohibitions and the opposing expert
opinions on the relative importance of scientific consensus for these rationales. This
Part uncovers how vague arguments about “outcomes for children” mask fears
about the transmission of sexual orientation identity. Moreover, it borrows from
noted gay-rights scholars to reveal how the stated government interest in dualgender, biological parents is, at its core, a desire for parents to be straight role
models.
Part III analyzes why the reemergence of the immutability debate is
significant. It argues that where the immutability of sexual orientation is otherwise
settled for level-of-scrutiny analysis, the introduction of children to the debate
allows opponents of gay rights to use outcomes for children as a proxy for their
anxieties about the production and reproduction of divergent sexual orientation and
gender identities, or what Professor Clifford J. Rosky calls “fear of the queer

10. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.
2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-1556, 2015 WL 2473451 (June 26, 2015). In its
historic ruling, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to license marriages
between two people of the same sex and to recognize marriage between two people of the same sex
when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out of state. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 141556, slip op. at 22–23, 27–28 (June 26, 2015). Notably, the Court did not take up the issue of
“outcomes for children,” which was a unique focus in the DeBoer trial. The Court also declined to
address the level-of-scrutiny that should be afforded to laws that employ sexual orientation-based
classifications. In its wake, Obergefell leaves ripe for litigation the possibility that classifications based on
sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny.
11. DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
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child.”12 Part III then suggests advocates and courts should instead focus on more
important normative questions about the state’s interest in producing genderconforming, heterosexual children.
I.

THE IMMUTABILITY FACTOR IN ASSESSING HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY

A review of the doctrinal framework in which adult sexual orientation claims
are made under the equal protection clause provides a point of comparison for the
following sections on “outcomes for children.” This Part demonstrates how the
immutability of adult sexual orientation is not dispositive of whether the
orientation-based class deserves heightened scrutiny.13 Specifically, this section
explores the evolution of the heightened scrutiny doctrine in case law and provides
a brief overview of why the immutability of sexual orientation was a controversial
factor in litigation. It concludes by showing that in recent Equal Protection
decisions, immutability has become less contentious and courts have begun to
privilege a narrative vision of sexual orientation identity over abstruse scientific
consensus.
The “tiers of scrutiny” approach to Equal Protection first emerged in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., a case involving interstate commerce in skimmed milk.14
The Supreme Court held that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional” unless there is a reason to
“preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”15 However, in its famous Footnote
Four, the Court recognized that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition . . . curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [therefore] may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”16 In the years following Carolene

12. Clifford J. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 607, 608 (2012) (arguing
government has no legitimate interest in “encouraging children to be straight”).
13. Among the factors in evaluating which level of scrutiny a class is afforded under the Equal
Protection clause, courts consider approximately four factors: (1) whether the class has a history of
discrimination against it; (2) whether the classification is related to the class’s ability to contribute to
society; (3) whether the class is sufficiently politically powerless; and (4) whether the classification is
immutable. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 146 (2011)
(noting, however, that “[d]ifferent courts emphasize different factors without any real explanation why
some are more important than others”). Id. at 138–39. I use “approximately” because courts describe
and apply these factors in different ways; for example, Strauss also identifies a fifth factor: the relevancy
of the trait. Id. at 146. Strauss also pointed out the following:
[I]t is not clear whether a suspect class must meet all of [the factors], most of them, or just
some of them. After over fifty years of employing these factors, significant questions still
remain about the meaning of the factors for determining one of the most important
questions in constitutional law: whether and when a legislative judgment involving equal
protection of the law should be rigorously scrutinized by a court.
Id. at 147.
14. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 152 n.4.
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Products, the Court developed a framework for evaluating which classes deserved
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause.17
Immutability as a factor precipitating heightened scrutiny first emerged in a
plurality decision in Frontiero v. Richardson.18 The Court, in finding that discrimination
based on sex warranted heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause,
stated a number of reasons for its decision: laws have historically been based on
“gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes . . . comparable to that of blacks
under the pre-Civil War slave codes”;19 “women still face pervasive, although at
times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market
and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena”;20 “sex, like race and
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth”;21 “the
sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society”;22 and finally, “Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to
sex-based classifications.”23
Nearly a decade later, the Court considered the constitutionality of Georgia’s
sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick24 and whether the Constitution “confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”25 Although the Court
relied upon the substantive due process clause to uphold the sodomy statute,26 the
Court’s reasoning is nonetheless applicable to the alleged mutability of sexual
orientation identity. The Court’s framing of the issue as the “right of homosexuals
to engage in acts of sodomy,” or “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy,”27 emphasizes its perception of conduct, rather than identity, as definitive
of the class. The Court found the Georgia law was supported by a rational basis—
the moralistic view that “homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.”28
Interestingly, the Bowers Court found that there was “[n]o connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
other.”29

17. Strauss, supra note 13, at 144 (identifying Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944), as the first instance in which the Court first referred to race as a suspect class).
18. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
19. Id. at 685.
20. Id. at 686.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 687 (providing the example of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
25. Id. at 190.
26. The Court applies heightened scrutiny to those rights deemed to be fundamental under the
substantive due process clause. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942)
(striking down a law involving the forced sterilization of convicts because marriage and procreation are
basic civil rights, and thus strict scrutiny of the law is required).
27. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
28. Id. at 196.
29. Id. at 191.
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Following the adverse decision in Bowers, the pro-gay rights movement began
to embrace immutability, arguing that scientific experiments proved that human
sexual orientation is biological.30 Advocates reasoned that if gay and lesbian identity
were biologically determined, it could be distinguished from the Court’s treatment
of homosexual sodomy as voluntary conduct in Bowers.31 As Janet Halley points out
in her critique of the immutability factor, this essentialist view of sexual orientation
entirely fails to represent those pro-gay constituencies that deny the
centrality of a particularized homosexual orientation to their psychic
makeup, whether because they identify as bisexual, because they seek to
de-emphasize the gender parameters of sexuality, because they are
experimental about sexuality, or because they experience sexuality not as
serious self-expressiveness but as play, drag, and ironic self-reflexivity.32
The pro-gay essentialist legal argument relying on biological causation thus leaves
out the voices of many LGB-identified individuals who are critical of the view that
they are a minority defined by a “natural” identity.33 Simultaneously, opponents of
gay rights likewise argue homosexual orientation is biologically fixed—that
discrimination toward the group should be tailored “to express normative
judgments, deter manifestations of homosexual orientation, or to cure homosexuals
of their illness”—or alternatively, if homosexual orientation is mutable,
discrimination should be designed to convert gay and lesbian desire into
heterosexuality34
In 1996, pro-gay advocates successfully challenged the validity of an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive,
or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination in
Romer v. Evans.35 The Court, without asking whether a more searching inquiry would
be appropriate, held that the law failed to meet even rational basis review.36 The
Court found the amendment “impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated disability on
a single named group,” and “its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward
the class it affects.”37 Careful to avoid a ruling on the scrutiny warranted by the
classification, the Court stated in broad terms that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional
because it “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board.”38

30. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504–05 (1994).
31. Id. at 512–14.
32. Id. at 520.
33. Id. at 504–05.
34. Id. at 517.
35. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
36. Id. at 632.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 633.
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Seven years later, the Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.39 In a 6–3
decision, the Court struck down Texas’s law criminalizing sodomy, finding the
liberty interest protected by substantive due process under the due process clause
extended to intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults.40 The Court did
not address whether sexual orientation warranted heightened scrutiny under the
equal protection clause, nor did it explicitly address any of the factors relevant to
such an inquiry.41 Cases in the context of sexual-orientation-based classifications
subsequent to Lawrence have focused on the political powerlessness factor,42 and the
fight over the immutability of sexual orientation under the equal protection clause
in the last decade has been relatively quiet.
The gay rights movement then began to utilize state litigation. In 2008, the
California Supreme Court considered a case consolidating six separate challenges to
the state’s Family Code, which defined marriage as between a man and a woman.43
The Court distinguished the challenge from other state challenges to same-sex
marriage bans because California had created a domestic partnership scheme under
which same-sex couples received virtually all of the same legal benefits and
privileges that married couples were afforded.44 The California Supreme Court
subjected the statute to strict scrutiny on two grounds: first because sexual
orientation is a suspect classification under the California Constitution,45 and
second because the differential treatment accorded to same-sex couples impinged
upon same-sex couples’ fundamental privacy interest in having an official family
relationship accorded with equal respect and dignity as that of an opposite-sex
couple.46 Concluding sexual orientation is a suspect classification, the Court
39. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40. Id.
41. See Strauss, supra note 13, at 146 (listing the basic factors for determining suspect class
status).
42. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 645–46 (“[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct
tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities . . . and, of course, care about
homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they possess political power
much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide.”); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d
996, 1009–10 (D. Nev. 2012) (“In the present case, it simply cannot be disputed that there have
historically been sufficient pro-homosexual legislators (or anti-homosexual and indifferent legislators
who can be democratically bargained with) in the state of Nevada to protect homosexuals from
oppression as a general matter.”), rev’d sub nom. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 446–48 (Conn. 2008) (focusing on the lack of gay
representatives in the federal judiciary, the U.S. Senate, business, academia, statewide office, and the
state judiciary). See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians,
Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975 (2014) (analyzing the political
powerlessness factor in Equal Protection cases brought by gay and lesbian plaintiffs).
43. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (Cal. 2008).
44. Id. at 379–98.
45. This issue was one of first impression in California. Id. at 840–41. The equal protection
clause of the California Constitution mirrors the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, but is not “confined to [the doctrine] of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.”
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 129–30 (Cal. 2009).
46. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400–02. On the latter point regarding the fundamental
right to marriage, the California Supreme Court found the public had a significant interest in marriage.
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reasoned that “[b]ecause a person’s sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of
one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or
her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.”47 The Court also
implicitly referred to immutability, stating:
[O]ur state now recognizes that an individual’s capacity to establish a loving
and long-term committed relationship with another person and
responsibly to care for and raise children does not depend on the
individual’s orientation, and, more generally, that an individual’s sexual
orientation—like a person’s race or gender—does not constitute a legitimate
basis upon which to deny or withhold legal rights.48
The California Supreme Court ultimately found the designation of marriage as a
union “between a man and a woman” unconstitutional.
The same year, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether same-sex
couples were subject to discrimination because of their sexual orientation in
violation of the Connecticut Constitution.49 Integral to this decision was the
recognition that sexual orientation constitutes a quasisuspect classification for
purposes of the equal protection provisions of the Connecticut Constitution.50
Looking to federal constitutional law, the Court determined immutability to be a
relevant but not required factor for heightened scrutiny.51 Additionally, it declined
to consider whether sexual orientation is immutable in the same way that race,
national origin, and gender are immutable because the Court agreed with the
plaintiffs’ contention “that their sexual orientation represents the kind of
distinguishing characteristic that defines them as a discrete group for purposes of
determining . . . heightened protection.”52 The Court held that it is “indisputable
that sexual orientation ‘forms a significant part of a person’s identity,’”53 and that
“[i]t is equally apparent that, ‘because a person’s sexual orientation is so integral an

Chief Justice George stated the following:
Society, of course, has an overriding interest in the welfare of children, and the role marriage
plays in facilitating a stable family setting in which children may be raised by two loving
parents unquestionably furthers the welfare of children and society. In addition, the role of
the family in educating and socializing children serves society’s interest by perpetuating the
social and political culture and providing continuing support for society over generations. It
is these features that the California authorities have in mind in describing marriage as the
“basic unit” or “building block” of society.
Id. at 423 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 442–43.
48. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). Later, however, the Court notes, “the constitutional right to
marry has never been viewed as the sole preserve of individuals who are physically capable of having
children.” Id. at 430.
49. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008).
50. Id. at 412. The Connecticut Constitution’s equal protection provisions mirror the United
States Constitution’s. Id.
51. Id. at 426.
52. Id. at 436–38.
53. Id. at 437 (citing Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or
change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.’”54
As challenges to state bans on same-sex marriage became more prevalent,55
federal recognition of same-sex marriages could not be ignored. Attorney General
Eric H. Holder, Jr. submitted a letter to House Speaker John A. Boehner outlining
the Executive Branch’s decision not to defend Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA).56 The Department of Justice (DOJ) took the position that Section 3
violated the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution.57 Although the letter
ultimately concluded that the law failed to withstand rational basis scrutiny, the DOJ
memorandum analyzed the variables weighing in favor of heightened scrutiny
protection for sexual orientation.58 Regarding immutability, the DOJ stated, “while
sexual orientation carries no visible badge, a growing scientific consensus accepts
that sexual orientation is immutable; it is undoubtedly unfair to require sexual
orientation to be hidden from view to avoid discrimination.”59
DOMA was subsequently struck down on June 26, 2013, in United States v.
Windsor.60 The Court defined the class protected by Equal Protection not based on
sexual orientation, but as “those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made
lawful by the State.”61 In striking down the law, the Court noted that DOMA
“humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.
The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in

54. Id. at 438 (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (Cal. 2008)).
55. Not all challenges to same-sex marriage laws have been successful. A Nevada federal
District Court in 2012 considered whether Nevada’s constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriages
and refusal to recognize such marriages from other jurisdictions violated same-sex couples’ equal
protection rights. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 997 (D. Nev. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Latta v.
Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). The District Court answered no. In a brief paragraph, the Court
avoided the question of immutability, since the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the immutability
of homosexuality. Id. at 1008.
56. Section 3 of DOMA stated:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or a wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
57. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehener, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with author).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Because the DOJ had decided not to
defend DOMA, a congressional group, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”), intervened to
defend the statute’s constitutionality. On the same day, the Court issued its opinion in Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). The Court considered whether California’s Proposition 8, a voter-enacted
ballot initiative amending California’s Constitution to ban same-sex marriage, violated the rights of
same-sex couples under the United States Constitution. Id. at 2659. Before reaching the merits, the
Court held that the proponents of Proposition 8 did not have standing for the appeal. Id. at 2668.
61. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
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their community and in their daily lives.”62 Since Windsor, state and federal judges
have issued over sixty decisions relating to same-sex marriage.63
These cases demonstrate that, while immutability is relevant, it is neither
dispositive nor highly contested at the present moment in gay rights litigation. Some
courts, like in Kerrigan and In re Marriage Cases, found that sexual orientation warrants
heightened scrutiny. Others, including Romer and Windsor, did not even address what
level of scrutiny sexual-orientation-based classifications received because laws that
discriminate against sexual-orientation-based classes fail to meet rational basis
review. Generally, courts do not ask whether an identity is biologically determined,
but whether it is central to a person’s identity such that it would be abhorrent for
the government to penalize a person for refusing to change it. Thus, the
immutability of sexual orientation identity is effectively settled.
II. DEBOER V. SNYDER—A CHALLENGE TO MICHIGAN’S BAN ON
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION LAWS
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse live in Oakland County, Michigan. They are
domestic partners and parents to minors N., R., and J.64 April is a nurse in a neonatal
intensive care unit at a hospital in Detroit, and at another Detroit hospital, Jayne is
an emergency room nurse.65 April and Jayne had volunteered to care for and adopt
each of their three children, who were neglected by their biological parents and in
poor medical condition after tragic circumstances surrounding their births.66
Together, April and Jayne raise N., R., and J., and eventually hope to adopt all three
children as coparents through second-parent adoption.67
When April and Jayne filed their complaint, Michigan law prohibited all
unmarried couples from jointly adopting children and thus prevented April and
Jayne from both being legal parents to their three children on the basis of their
marital status.68 Michigan law also prevented same-sex couples from getting
married.69 Together, these laws operated to ban all same-sex couples from jointly
adopting children. Laws like these, which do not explicitly ban LGB parents from
adopting but operate instead as informal barriers to adoption, existed in a majority
of states before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell.70
62. Id. at 2694.
63. Marriage Litigation, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation
[http://perma.cc/7RXV-ZRXE] (last visited July 2, 2015). As of August 6, 2014, the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had cases pending on appeal. Id.
64. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1, 8, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(No. 12-10285). The minors were named by their initials in the complaint to protect their identities.
65. Id. ¶ 9.
66. Complaint ¶¶ 10–12, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 1210285).
67. Id. ¶ 15.
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.24 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
69. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. I, § 25 (2004).
70. For a chart comparing the laws on joint adoption, second-parent adoption, and step-parent
adoption as they apply to LGBT parents, see 50 States of Adoption, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL,
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Arguments used to justify these informal bans on LGB parenting formed the
basis for an Eleventh Circuit decision in 2004 upholding a Florida law prohibiting
LGB parents from adopting.71 Lofton involved an equal protection challenge by
foster parents who had been denied their applications to adopt based on their sexual
orientation.72 Florida’s adoption law prohibited adoption by “homosexual” persons,
defined as “applicants who are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual
activity.”73 The Eleventh Circuit first denied that the plaintiffs had any fundamental
right to family integrity or private sexual intimacy, which meant that the statute
needed to survive only rational basis review.74 The court then recognized the special
circumstances involved in parenting and reasoned that “[b]ecause of the primacy of
the welfare of the child, the state can make classifications for adoption purposes
that would be constitutionally suspect in many other arenas.”75 The court identified
Florida’s interest in encouraging a stable and nurturing environment for the
education and socialization of its adopted children as a “clearly . . . legitimate
interest.”76 As support for its finding, the court stated,
It is chiefly from parental figures that children learn about the world and
their place in it, and the formative influence of parents extends well beyond
the years spent under their roof, shaping their children’s psychology,
character, and personality for years to come. In time, children grow up to
become full members of society, which they in turn influence, whether for
good or ill. The adage that “the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world”
hardly overstates the ripple effect that parents have on the public good by
virtue of their role in raising their children. It is hard to conceive an interest
http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/families_for_all/50_states_of_adoption [http://perma
.cc/CB2H-7PZR] (last visited July 11, 2015). As of July 11, 2015, fifteen states and D.C. allow secondparent adoption by LGBT couples. Relatedly, only seven states support fostering by LGBT parents by
restricting discrimination, forty-two states and D.C. are silent on fostering by LGBT parents, and only
Nebraska restricts fostering by LGBT parents. Mississippi is the only state in which same-sex couples
face legal restrictions when petitioning for adoption. Some states, including North Dakota, Michigan,
and Virginia permit state-licensed child welfare agencies to refuse to place and provide services to
children and families, including LGBT people and same-sex couples, if doing so conflicts with their
religious beliefs. Second-Parent Adoption Laws, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, http://
www.familyequality.org/get_informed/equality_maps/second-parent_adoption_laws [http://perma
.cc/SUC5-LYFU] (last visited July 11, 2015). An earlier version of this site indicated that on September
21, 2014, the majority of states had barriers restricting the ability of LGBT people and same-sex couples
from adopting. See 50 States of Adoption, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, http://www
.familyequality.org/get_informed/families_for_all/50_states_of_adoption [http://web.archive.org/web/
20140921060330/http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/families_for_all/50_states_of_adoption]
(visited Sept. 21, 2014). Only nineteen states and D.C. permitted joint adoption by same-sex couples;
only thirteen states and D.C. permitted second-parent adoption by same-sex couples; and only six states
explicitly banned discrimination based on sexual orientation in foster care.
71. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 806–07 (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995)).
74. Id. at 811–17.
75. Id. at 810 (citing statutory preferences for certain factors in parents and placements).
76. Id. at 819.
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more legitimate and more paramount for the state than promoting an
optimal social structure for educating, socializing, and preparing its future
citizens to become productive participants in civil society—particularly
when those future citizens are displaced children for whom the state is
standing in loco parentis.77
Florida claimed that its “preference for adoptive marital families was based on the
premise that the marital family structure is more stable than household
arrangements and that children benefit from the presence of both a father and
mother in the home.”78 The court relied on no social science evidence—nor did it
require that the Florida legislature base its premise in social science evidence—to
support its finding that the ban on LGB parents was rationally related to the state’s
interest in encouraging stable and nurturing environments for children. Instead, the
court stated, “Given that appellants have offered no competent evidence to the
contrary, we find this premise to be one of those ‘unprovable assumptions’ that
nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for legislative action.”79
Six years after Lofton was decided, Florida was the last state to overturn its ban
on LGB adoption.80 Yet Lofton has never been formally overruled. Moreover, the
same assumptions about the benefits of the marital form, the need for both male
and female role models,81 and the inadequacy of same-sex couples’ parenting persist
in states that informally prohibit same-sex couples from adopting.
A. “Outcomes for Children” as a Mask for Immutability Arguments
What began in Michigan as a case about the legal right for April and Jayne to
parent each other’s legally adopted child or children evolved into a constitutional
challenge to the voter-initiative that amended the Michigan Constitution to prohibit
same-sex couples from marrying. Nine months after their initial complaint was filed,
April and Jayne filed an amended complaint, in which they sought a declaratory
judgment invalidating the “Michigan Marriage Amendment” under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause.82
Despite the change in legal strategy, children remained at the center of the
debate. In opening statements at trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel framed the case around
children: “This case is about marriage equality, and it’s also about the well being of

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 819–20 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62–63 (1973)).
80. See CNN Wire Staff, Florida Ends Ban on Gay, Lesbian Adoptions, CNN (Oct. 22, 2010, 5:21
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/22/florida.gay.adoptions/index.html [http://perma.cc/
9FDD-495M].
81. See Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, supra note 12, at 651 (“In the ensuing decades, the role
modeling fear has served as the primary justification for laws that target LGBT parents, such as statutes
prohibiting lesbian and gay people from adopting.”).
82. Amended Complaint ¶ 26, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (No.
12-10285).
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children.”83 Likewise, Defendants84 opened their case by stating: “This case is about
one thing, your Honor, the will of the people. The people of the State of Michigan
have decided to retain the definition of marriage that encourages what’s best of [sic]
children being raised by both a mom and dad.”85
DeBoer is significant because it signaled—during a tidal wave of federal
marriage litigation—a distraction from what should be the determinative issue:
whether a person’s sexual orientation should be relevant to their ability to get legally
married and be recognized by each state as such. The same-sex marriage ban
defenders in DeBoer narrowed in on a peripheral issue, arguing that because marriage
often involves children and children learn from their parents, there might be
something less than ideal about an environment constructed by parents who are not
of different sexes. But what separates same-sex parents from opposite-sex parents?
The parents’ gender and sexuality. And to the extent that a parent’s gender or
sexuality is relevant to a child’s upbringing, the defenders of the ban suggested that
learning about or reproducing divergent gender identities and sexual identities as
acceptable or even glorified creates an inferior environment to raise children.86 On
this ground, same-sex couples should not marry or raise children. The debate
therefore transitioned into a question of whether same-sex parents do or do not
reproduce or teach their children about gender and sexual orientation identities (i.e.,
the immutability of such traits). This debate is characterized as a “distraction”
because, as previously discussed in Part I, courts no longer recognize immutability
as a decisive factor in the level-of-scrutiny analysis.
The following sections summarize the testimony introduced by each side’s
experts over the course of eight days of testimony related to the question of whether
the Michigan statute survived rational basis review.87 The parties were directed to
focus their testimony on the rationales offered by State defendants: “(1) providing
children with ‘biologically connected’ role models of both genders that are necessary
to foster healthy psychological development; (2) avoiding the unintended
consequences that might result from redefining marriage; (3) upholding tradition
and morality; and (4) promoting the transition of ‘naturally procreated relationships
into stable unions.’”88 The first subsection summarizes the testimony about the
justification itself, the existence or absence of the “No Difference Consensus.” The
83. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 3.
84. For clarity, “Defendants” will refer to the state defendants, Governor Richard Snyder and
Attorney General Bill Schuette, who were represented by the same trial counsel. Defendant Lisa Brown,
Oakland Country Clerk, was represented separately. Brown took the position that she was “ready to
move forward with the issuance of licenses to same sex couples.” Id. at 55.
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id. at 64–65 (discussing poorer outcomes among children raised by same-sex parents
compared to children raised by opposite-sex parents, and including “[m]ore female sex partners among
women [and m]ore male sex partners among men.”).
87. The Sixth Circuit precedent does not consider sexual orientation a suspect or quasisuspect
classification. See Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012); Scarborough v.
Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006).
88. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
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second subsection lays out a related issue—whether the “convenience studies” used
to form the “No Difference Consensus” are reliable and an adequate basis to justify
a finding that the Michigan law does not satisfy rational basis.
This summary should be read with two purposes in mind. First, although the
explicit focus in DeBoer is on “outcomes for children,” the implicit focus was the
immutability of sexual orientation. In short, Defendant’s argument is that the best
environment to raise a child is one in which it is raised by a biologically related,
married, mother and father. Claims about the benefits of biological parenting are
code for dual-gender parenting, in which sex-differentiated gender roles are key,
rather than a biological relationship to the child.89 And, as Part III demonstrates,
the desire for sex-differentiated gender role modeling is ultimately about the desire
for straight role models for children. Second, the disagreement between experts
about “outcomes for children” is a rabbit hole, distracting us from more pressing
discussions of normative questions about the state’s interest in heterosexual
children.
B. The “No Difference Consensus”
At trial, Plaintiffs primarily sought to prove the “No Difference Consensus”—
the conclusion that there is no difference between outcomes for children of samesex parents and children of opposite-sex parents.90 Supported by professional
organizations,91 Plaintiffs claimed the following:
There’s no scientific basis for concluding that lesbian mothers and gay
fathers are unfit parents on the basis of their sexual orientation. Overall,
the results of the research suggest that development, adjustment, and well
being of children with lesbian and gay parents do not differ markedly than
that of children raised by heterosexual parents.92
Plaintiffs’ counsel responded to the possibility that the court would find the
competing studies inconclusive, arguing that “[a]nother generation of Michigan’s
children should not have to await the perfect longitudinal study before they have
rights, before they can enjoy stability, before they can really count on that second
parent.”93
Defendants, on the other hand, sought to prove that children fare worse when
raised by LBG parents, and that the social research science on LBG parenting does
not reach such a consensus.94 Regarding the first point, Defendants stated the
following in their Opening Statement:
89. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 83, 92 (2013).
90. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 18.
91. Id. The organizations supporting same-sex parenting are the American Psychological
Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, the American
Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescence Psychiatry, the National
Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League of America.
92. Id. (citing language from the American Psychological Association).
93. Id. at 36.
94. One of Defendants’ experts was disqualified from testifying because he was not deemed to
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Our experts are going to tell you that there are reasons for defining
marriage as between one man and one woman that have nothing to do with
animus. Our experts are going to explain to you why the “No Difference
Consensus” that plaintiffs rely on is flawed. They will tell you that the
studies relied on to come to this so-called “No Difference Consensus”
suffer from three major deficiencies.95
On the latter point, Defendants’ counsel stated, “we’re dealing with . . . a new and
emerging area of social science. Same sex marriage has only been in existence in the
United States since 2004. A decade, your Honor, is not enough time to determine
with any certainty the affects that same sex marriage will have.”96
Psychologist David Brodzinksy was Plaintiffs’ first witness and testified that
there are no “discernable differences” between children who were raised by samesex couples from those raised by opposite-sex couples.97 Brodzinsky’s opinion was
based on a number of studies that measured “child outcomes” based on long-term
adjustment difficulties, which are predicted by a number of measures, including
psychological adjustment, gender role behavior, peer relationships, school
functioning, school progress, behavior and symptomatology, victimization, and
conduct problems like illicit substance abuse and delinquency.98 He testified that
positive child adjustment was correlated with factors including the quality of parentchild relationship, the quality of the relationship between the parents, the
characteristics and styles of parenting that parents adopt, the types of educational
opportunities that children are afforded, the resources within the family, the
resources outside of the family, and the mental health of the parents.99
When asked whether there was any evidence that children need a male and
female parent for positive child development, Brodzinsky replied, “The answer is
no. It’s not the gender of the parent that’s the key. It’s the quality of parenting that’s
being offered by whoever is there, husband or wife, two women, two men, a single
be an expert. Ed White, Michigan’s Witness in Gay Marriage Trial Barred, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 3, 2014,
12:11 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/michigans-witness-gay-marriage-trial-barred-171156615.html
[https://perma.cc/4RKX-TU93?type=image].
95. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 43–44.
96. Id. at 42–43.
97. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 30. In his direct examination, Brodzinsky
specifically stated the following:
My conclusions about the outcomes for children, based upon this research, is that
children of gay and lesbian individuals show no discernable differences in outcomes and in
general characteristics, developmental characteristics, compared to children of
heterosexuals.
And the other conclusion that I reach is that the parenting qualities of gays and lesbians
are no different than the parenting qualities of heterosexual individuals. And the couple
relationships of those who are parenting children are no different in heterosexual families
and gay and lesbian families.
Id. Brodzinsky is a developmental clinical and forensic psychologist, specializing in adoption and foster
care, child development, nontraditional family life, parenting by same-sex couples, and parenting by gay
and lesbian individuals. Id. at 1–5.
98. Id. at 26–27.
99. Id. at 10. Brodzinsky also testified extensively about the increased risk of maladjustment for
adopted children, based on factors not related to biological ties. Id. at 40.
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parent, as long as the factors that we listed up there [correlated with positive child
adjustment] are present.”100 Brodzinsky testified that, in his opinion, there are also
no differences in outcomes when comparing donor-conceived children to children
raised by their biological parents.101
Plaintiffs’ second expert sociologist Michael Rosenfeld likewise focused on the
scholarly consensus within the discipline of sociology. He concluded, “children
raised by same sex couples are at no disadvantage.”102 Based on his cross-sectional
study of approximately seven hundred thousand primary school children from the
2000 Census data, Rosenfeld found the following:
[P]rogress through school for children raised by same sex couples is just as
good as the progress through school for children raised by any other kind
of family when you compare similarly situated families, that is, families with
the same incomes, families with the same parental education and so on.103
Rosenfeld’s research controlled for factors like parental income, parental education,
the child’s relationship to the head of the household, race, and whether the child
lives in a suburb or city.104 Other studies that attempted to replicate his own study
of children’s progress in school based on Census data came up with different
conclusions because Rosenfeld’s study excluded children “whose family [situations]
through school we didn’t know,” thus excluding, for example, nonbiological
children of the head of household and children who had not been living with the
same parents for the five years prior to the Census.105 On cross-examination,
Rosenfeld admitted that his study was limited by the imprecision of the Census in
identifying same-sex couples, in identifying relationships between family members,
and in measuring outcomes for children based only on progress through school.106
Economist Douglas Allen, expert for the Defendants, identified Rosenfeld’s
study using data collected from the U.S. Census as the first study that utilized a large
random sample, calling it a “watershed paper.”107 Allen and two others replicated
Rosenfeld’s study.108 Based on his replication of Rosenfeld’s study, Allen testified
that he did not agree with the Rosenfeld results, criticizing Rosenfeld’s

100. Id. at 19.
101. Id. at 61.
102. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 4, at 51. Rosenfeld further testified that the
consensus in the field of sociology was expressed through an Amicus Brief submitted by the American
Sociological Association for Perry and Windsor. Michael Rosenfeld is an Associate Professor of Sociology
at Stanford University, and he concentrates his work in family and marriage, children and child
development, and marriage and divorce. Id. at 48.
103. Id. at 61.
104. Id. at 66–68.
105. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 2, pt. 1, at 35–37.
106. Id. at 39.
107. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 8, at 32.
108. Id.
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interpretations of the statistical differences,109 his sample restrictions,110 and his
control methodology in the regression.111 The only other large random sample study
that Allen could identify was his own, using the Canada Census, which had an
advantage over the U.S. Census because couples could self-identify as a same-sex
couple.112 Allen’s analysis of the Canada census data showed that girls raised in gay
or lesbian households have a decreased likelihood of graduating high school, but
Allen found no statistically significant difference for boys raised in gay or lesbian
households.113 Allen testified that the U.S. Census results and the Canada Census
results were the only two large studies available that provide a reliable measure of
actual difference in outcomes of children in same-sex households and children in
opposite-sex households.114
Rosenfeld’s conclusions were also criticized by Defense expert witness Joseph
Price, an economist who testified that when he analyzed the data Rosenfeld used,
he came to the conclusion that there is a difference in progress in school between
children raised by same-sex couples versus children raised by opposite-sex
parents.115 Price and Rosenfeld used different omitted groups when analyzing the
same data set.116 Price found that there was a statistically significant level of
difference in the data, indicating that a child raised by a same-sex couple is less likely
to make normal progress in school and ultimately that the child is more likely to be
held back.117 Price also testified that “the odds of a child in a heterosexual married
household is about 15 percent higher that [sic] will be making normal progress

109. Allen’s criticism was that Rosenfeld concluded that there was no difference between
normal progression in children raised by same-sex households and children raised in opposite-sex
households, when Allen instead suggested that there was no statistical difference. Id. at 44.
110. The “own child” restriction was a way in which Rosenfeld compared biological children
of same-sex parents to biological children of opposite-sex parents, leaving out, for example, children
who were not related to the head of the household and adopted children. Id. at 45–46. When Dr. Allen
took into account the problems he found with Dr. Rosenfeld’s sample restrictions, Dr. Allen found
statistically significant differences. Id. at 49.
111. Id. at 34, 40–41. The last aspect of the study Allen criticized was the five-year residency
restriction, which Rosenfeld employed as a “proxy variable” for a previous transition in the family, like
divorce or separation. Id. at 47, 50. Allen opined that the five-year period was overinclusive—that
families that happened to move would be excluded from the results. Id. at 47–48. To address this
problem, Allen testified that his study took into consideration whether the family had moved in the last
five years. Id. at 52.
112. Id. at 32, 56. The study based on the Canada Census, unlike Rosenfeld’s study based on
the U.S. Census, could only measure whether a child graduated from high school, not the child’s
progress through school. Id. at 59–60.
113. Id. at 61.
114. Id. at 39.
115. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 6, pt. 3, at 55–56.
116. Id. at 59. For example, Rosenfeld applied the “stability restriction,” which asked each
person in the household whether they were in the same household five years ago, whereas Price did
not impose the same restriction. Id. at 80. Price criticized this restriction on the grounds that it
dramatically reduced the precision of the estimates and also cut off two of the channels through which
family structure affects child outcomes—relatedness and stability. Id. at 88.
117. Id. at 56.
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through school than a child raised by a same sex couples [sic].”118 Responding to
Price’s criticism, Rosenfeld testified that Price’s replication of Rosenfeld’s study
exaggerated the results by at least fifty times.119
To justify the Michigan law, Defendants called on sociologist Mark Regnerus.
Regnerus based much of his testimony on the results of his New Family Structure
Study (NFSS), a large population-based study that called into question the “No
Differences Consensus” with respect to the intact biological family, based on data
collected from young adults between the ages of eighteen and thirty-nine.120 The
NFSS concluded that there are twenty-four differences out of forty chosen
outcomes121 between children who grew up in intact, biological families, and
children whose mothers had a same-sex relationship at some point during their
childhood.122 There were fewer differences for children whose fathers had a samesex relationship.123 The majority of these respondents were children of failed
heterosexual unions.124 Some of the outcomes in which children whose parents had
a same-sex relationship fared worse than children with parents with an intact,
opposite-sex marriage were the increased likelihoods of being on public assistance
or unemployment; having an affair while married or cohabiting; having a sexually
transmitted infection; using marijuana; smoking tobacco; being arrested or pleading
guilty to a nonminor offense; having a female sexual partner if the participant was
a woman; and having a male sexual partner if the participant was a man.125 Children
whose parents had a same-sex relationship were identified as having a decreased
likelihood of full-time employment, educational attainment, and safety or
security.126 Taking all of the studies done on outcomes for children and the
limitations of these studies into consideration, Regnerus testified that no
conclusions, and particularly not a “no difference” conclusion, should be drawn.127
Regnerus testified that it “seems premature to say that something that involves a

118. Id. at 64–65.
119. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 4, at 87.
120. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 5, pt. 2, at 38–39.
121. Id. at 49. The forty outcomes were chosen out of between eighty and one hundred possible
distinctive outcomes. These forty were chosen to be a broad representation of the child’s formative
years. Id.
122. Id. at 40. Notably, Regnerus testified that the NFSS participants were asked “Did your
mother ever have a romantic relationship with a member of the same sex?” and “Did your father ever
have a romantic relationship with a member of the same sex?” Id. at 41.
123. Id. at 40.
124. Id. at 52.
125. Id. at 64–65.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 86–87.
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reduced kinship,128 meaning somebody is not a biological parent to the child, to
claim there are no differences.”129
Regnerus recognized the limitations of the NFSS, primarily that it was not a
longitudinal study but was cross-sectional.130 The study did not focus on parental
same-sex orientation or sexual orientation identity.131 The NFSS did not ask about
the child’s origins, meaning that it did not take into account whether the child was
conceived using assistive reproductive technology.132 In summation, Regnerus
testified that the ideal environment for children would be one in which a biological
child is raised by their married mother and father, and that other environments are
necessary concessions.133
Regnerus was surprised by the severe and swift criticism of his study upon its
release.134 Earlier in the trial, Brodsinksy had criticized Regnerus’ study on the
grounds that the adult children selected for the study were born into families with
heterosexual parents, were not raised by same-sex parents, and generally had not
lived with the parent and their same-sex partner.135 The study compared the
experiences of young adults of intact marital families to families involving
“diminished kinship,” which Brodzinsky also criticized.136 Similarly, Rosenfeld
criticized Regnerus’ study on the basis that “[Regnerus] wasn’t actually analyzing the
data for children who are really raised by same sex couples.”137 Analyzing Regnerus’
data, Rosenfeld concluded that “what predicts the negative outcomes in these
subjects is the number of transitions they went through as children.”138
C. Convenience Sampling
Experts for both Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed that the majority of studies
on LGB parenting used convenience sampling.139 This type of sampling is often

128. The term “reduced kinship” refers to families that are not in the ideal situation in which a
married mother and father in a stable relationship reside with their child, which includes adoptive and
foster families, as well as an otherwise intact family where a parent is absent due to, for example, military
service. Id. at 33–34.
129. Id. at 29.
130. Id. at 67. Put simply, a cross-sectional study is “a snapshot at one point in time,” and is not
adequate for addressing causal claims. Id.
131. Id. The purpose of the study, according to Regnerus, was to study children’s parents’
relationship behavior rather than the parent’s self-identification of their sexual orientation. Id. at 72.
132. Id. at 69.
133. Id. at 113–14.
134. Id. at 94.
135. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 64.
136. Id. at 64–65.
137. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 4, at 98. Rosenfeld explained that Regnerus
“was building into his comparison of family type a comparison between children who had not had any
family transitions,” in which the mother and father were married to each other and stayed married for
the duration of the child’s minority life, to “children who had many.” Id. at 101.
138. Id. at 100.
139. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1 pt. 3, at 31–32 (testifying for Plaintiffs); Transcript
of Record, supra note 1, vol. 6, pt. 3, at 46–47 (testifying for Defendants).
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criticized because it is based on small sample sizes of self-selecting populations,
which can mean that the results of the study are not representative of a larger
population. If, as Defendants argued, the studies are only representative of a certain
population (generally wealthy, white lesbians), then the results of the studies cannot
be extrapolated to make claims about the outcomes for children raised by LGB
parents in the general population.140 Therefore, Defendants claimed, it was rational
for the people of Michigan to provide the best environment for children, one in
which they are raised by a biologically-related and married mother and father,
achieved in part by excluding same-sex couples from marriage.141
Addressing this criticism, Brodzinsky testified that the methodology of
convenience sampling is the “bread and butter” of psychology.142 Convenience
studies allow researchers to look “inside the family”; they allow researchers to take
into consideration the resources of parents, the style of parenting, the relationships
parents have to children, and the relationship between the parents.143
All four of Defendants’ experts criticized the use of convenience sampling.
Regnerus suggested that random, nationally representative, longitudinal, and
replicable studies would be a better base for major decisions like a state’s marriage
ban.144 Additionally, Regnerus suggested that this type of study is needed to
conclude that no difference exists between outcomes for children raised by samesex parents and children raised by opposite-sex parents.145 Price called into question
the limitations of convenience sampling, noting “it’s not clear whether you are
actually going to learn something about the group you care about because you are
going to end up with a group that selected themselves into your study.”146 Allen
reviewed sixty studies and concluded that they are not generalizable—the samples
focused on lesbian parents instead of both gay and lesbian parents and were crosssectional rather than longitudinal.147 Lastly, Loren Marks, an expert in family studies,
responded to the American Psychological Association’s (APA) position statement
on lesbian and gay parenting.148 Marks testified that the studies were not
representative of the population in terms of cultural, ethnic, and economic
diversity.149 The studies were based on convenience samples made mostly of lesbian

140. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 7, pt. 1, at 82.
141. Id. at 41–43.
142. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 33, 36.
143. Id. at 36–37.
144. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 5, pt. 2, at 21–26. Regnerus opined that it is unwise
to rely on nonprobability studies “to settle an intellectual about No Differences.” Id. at 111.
145. Id. at 36–37.
146. Id. at 46–47.
147. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 8, at 21, 23, 27. Dr. Allen did admit that there was
a consensus reached in the study, because the researchers came to the same conclusion, but that the
consensus was not warranted because it was based on fifty-five “preliminary” studies. Id. at 38.
148. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 7, pt. 1, at 64. Marks is an associate professor at
Louisiana State University. Id. at 58–59. He describes family studies as a hybrid between psychology
and sociology. Id.
149. Id. at 82–83.
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mothers—white, well educated, and wealthy—but not gay fathers.150 The studies
also often used single-parent heterosexual homes as the group representing all
heterosexual parents.151
On Friday, March 21, 2014, U.S. District Court Judge Bernard A. Friedman
ruled that the ban was unconstitutional, sending almost three hundred same-sex
couples to clerks’ offices for marriage licenses over the weekend.152 The following
Tuesday, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a stay on
marriage licenses for same-sex couples to allow the state to appeal the ruling.153 On
January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari for
consolidated cases from the Sixth Circuit.154
III. SHIFTING FROM OBJECTIVE TO NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A comparison of the previous sections on the movement away from seemingly
objective questions about the nature of adult sexual orientation in Part I and the
movement towards objective questions about “outcomes for children” in the
parenting context in Part II demonstrates that there is something unique at stake in
the latter context. This Part asserts that children are the difference—children are
gay rights opponents’ redirected focus from the acceptability of same-sex
relationships. Children are the proxy for anxieties about the production and
reproduction of divergent sexual orientation identities, and they allow the debate
about the immutability of sexual orientation to resurface. Rather than returning to
the debate over the nature of sexual orientation, courts should dismiss these
questions as irrelevant and instead center normative questions, drawing on the
treatment of sexual orientation identity in the equal protection context.
A. The Child as Proxy for Anxieties About Divergent Identities
Professor Clifford Rosky has characterized the anxieties about divergent
identities in children as the “fear of the queer child.”155 Describing this fear, Rosky
notes that it includes “fears that exposing children to homosexuality and gender
variance will make them more likely to develop homosexual desires, engage in
homosexual acts, form homosexual relationships, deviate from traditional gender

150. Id. at 84.
151. Id. at 86.
152. Order Granting Motion to Stay at 1, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No.
14-1341) (granting Michigan’s motion to stay the district court’s order pending final disposition of
Michigan’s appeal).
153. Kathleen Gray & Gina Damron, Appeals Court Keeps Stay on Michigan Gay Marriages, USA
TODAY (March 25, 2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/25/
michigan-gay-marriage/6883623 [http://perma.cc/F4J8-8L9A].
154. Oral arguments were heard on August 6, 2014. Maya Srikrishnan, Federal Court Takes Up
Gay Marriage Cases from 4 States, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/
nationnow/la-na-nn-gay-marriage-20140806-story.html [http://perma.cc/7ATA-TFW2].
155. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, supra note 12, at 608.
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norms, or identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender.”156 Identifying this fear
is useful for thinking about “child outcomes” because fear of the queer child is really
a fear that sexual orientation could be transmitted. If a parent can pass on the trait
of same-sex sexual orientation to a child who is otherwise not “born gay,” then the
child’s sexual orientation is not innate, not immutable. This fear, then, is also a fear
of the mutability of sexual orientation. Tracing the history of this fear from ancient
Greece, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to today,157 Rosky notes its
adaptability: “Over the course of centuries, the fear of the queer child has proved
to be a remarkably nimble adversary—broad, subtle, and manifold.”158 More
recently, “[d]uring the 1990s, opponents of LGBT rights shifted away from explicit
claims about children’s homosexuality, in favor of increasingly vague claims about
children’s variance from traditional gender roles and identities.”159 Rosky thus
identifies the ways in which this fear of the queer child is often blanketed in vague
claims that mask discussions about gender and sexuality variance.
Relying on family law cases, Rosky demonstrates how gay and lesbian parents
are often stereotyped as either recruiters, “people who overtly encourage children
to become homosexual by taking them to pro-gay events and exposing them to progay media,” or as role models, “people who subtly encourage children to become
homosexual by providing influential models of same-sex relationships.”160 Unlike
the overt stereotypes and criticisms made of parents in child custody disputes Rosky
analyzes, Defendants in DeBoer implicitly alleged that Jayne and April, as role
models, will provide suboptimal conditions for the rearing of their children—that
Jayne and April are ill equipped to provide an environment in which their children
can become straight boys and girls.
DeBoer illustrates what Rosky identifies—that opponents of LGBT rights
continue to fear the transmission of sexual orientation and gender identity and use
their concern for children as the proxy for this fear. Experts on both sides measured
outcomes for children in terms of gender, sexual orientation, and sexual experience.
For example, Plaintiffs’ expert Brodzinsky discussed children’s gender role
behavior.161 Defendants’ expert Regenerus measured outcomes through children’s
nonmonogamous relationships, same-sex relationships, and same-sex sexual
experience.162 Specifically, Defendants argue that the “optimal environment” for
raising children is one in which a child is raised by a married, biological mother and

156. Id. at 608.
157. Id. at 618–32.
158. Id. at 667.
159. Id. at 659.
160. Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of
Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 294 (2009).
161. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 26–27.
162. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 5, pt. 2, at 64–65.
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father.163 This argument presumes that mothers and fathers parent differently.164
The mother and father are assumed to play complementary parenting roles, in
which, for example, the mother teaches her child not only what it is to be a woman,
but also that women are attracted to men. Therefore, gender-based role modeling
arguments are not just about demonstrating proper gender roles to a child, but also
how a proper gender identity is a straight identity.165 Gender-based role modeling
is, underneath the rhetoric about optimal environments and child outcomes, about
the desire for parents to be straight role models.166
The rationales underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Lofton support the
proposition that children are the unique factor catalyzing the reemergence of the
immutability debate. The court began its discussion by distinguishing adoption from
other contexts, like criminal law, government-benefits schemes, and access to
public forums, because “the state’s overriding interest is the best interest of the
children.”167 To reiterate from Part II, the Eleventh Circuit then justified
constitutionally suspect classifications made in the adoption context “[b]ecause of
the primacy of the welfare of the child.”168 Opponents of same-sex marriage share
this concern for children and the role of the state, and similarly use children to
justify otherwise constitutionally intolerable classifications.
Unpacking Defendant’s argument in DeBoer reveals an empirical question
about sexual orientation and gender identity: how does a parent’s sexual orientation
influence a child’s sexual orientation or gender identity, or are those identities
biologically determined? In other words, is sexual orientation immutable? The
process of answering these questions should be guided by the heightened scrutiny
debate in the equal protection context.
B. Drawing on Lessons from the Heightened Scrutiny Debate
In the level-of-scrutiny debate described in Part I, courts treat immutability
not as a question of objective evidence, but as a question of whether the

163. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 41–42; Transcript of Record, supra note
1, vol. 6, pt. 1, at 73–74.
164. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 6, pt. 3, at 97–99 (testifying that “mothers spend[ ]
more time reading, talking, and doing house work with their children around the home,” but that in
contrast, fathers “tend to stress competition, challenge, initiative, risk taking, and independence”).
165. Rosky describes this desire as “draw[ing] support from conventional assumptions about
the process of sexual development—that before puberty, children have both homosexual and
heterosexual tendencies, and that during puberty, they develop sexual relationships based on models
provided by adults, especially parents.” Rosky, supra note 160, at 295.
166. Professor William N. Eskridge posits that marriage litigation is the best place for gay rights
advocates to challenge these assumptions: “From a liberal perspective, marriage as one man, one
woman is the ultimate testing ground for full public acceptance that variations in sex, gender, and
sexuality are all benign and not just tolerable.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation in
American Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1352 (2010).
167. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809–10 (11th Cir.
2004).
168. Id. at 810.
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characteristic is so central to the person’s identity as to make it abhorrent for the
government to penalize a person for refusing to change it.169 Likewise, courts should
treat LGB parenting with a similar apathy for empirical questions about the
transmission of sexual orientation and gender identity. Empirical questions are
distracting—constantly changing in form, purpose, and nuance; they are therefore
“hard to pin down.”170 Empirical questions on identity are also extremely difficult
to settle, as evidenced by the testimonial mess of experts in the DeBoer trial.171 As a
litigation strategy, focusing on empirical questions and expert testimony is a costly
endeavor.
Gay rights advocates impede this paradigm shift when making broad
conclusions about the immutability of sexual orientation identity. For example,
counsel for Jayne and April opened trial by stating:
[Thirty years ago,] in the face of that kind of discrimination most lesbians
and some gay men were trying to live straight lives. Like a lot of other
people they were inspiring. They wanted the State’s ideal family, too. They
wanted the picket fence, the children. They wanted an intact family. Many
lesbians and gay men were trying to function in heterosexual marriages.
Predictably it didn’t work. You can’t choose your orientation. Now we
know that, didn’t then.172
While grounded in doctrine, gay rights advocates’ use of immutability fails as a
rhetorical and political strategy, actively alienating those who do not experience their
sexual orientation as immutable.173 Instead, advocates should use the opportunity
to expose these arguments about biological preferentialism and dual-gender
parenting174 for what they are: claims masking the desire for heterosexual role
modeling. As Professor Douglas NeJaime suggests, “[b]iological preferentialism
reinvents arguments steeped in stereotypes. It should not be smuggled in to courts’
analysis as a veiled justification for laws that maintain the sex-based distinction in
marriage and withhold marriage from same-sex couples.”175 Preferences for
heterosexual role modeling invite debate about the immutability of sexual
orientation and its relevance—again, a distraction from a normative debate. Instead,

169. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
170. Rosky, supra note 12, at 667. Describing the fear itself, Rosky says, “[l]ike the facts it
describes, the fear is a moving target; it is hard to pin down and dispute on empirical grounds.” Id.
171. Id. at 668. “In one situation after another, when the empirical strategy is deployed against
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval fears, it runs up against the inherent uncertainty and
incompleteness of the factual record.” Id.
172. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 32.
173. See Halley, supra note 30, at 528. “Immutability offers no theoretical foundation for legal
protection of those gay men and lesbians who experience their sexual orientation as contingent,
mutable, chosen. . . . An adequate legal theory should protect the entire social class on whose behalf it
is articulated.” Id.
174. See NeJaime, supra note 89.
175. Id. at 95.
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advocates should recognize the replication of immutability arguments and appeal to
its irrelevance in the level of scrutiny context.
Once LGB advocates move on from debating the transmission of sexual
orientation from adult to child, they can focus on the more pressing issue—
challenging the normative premise that children are better off straight.176 As a
practical matter, the resurfacing of immutability arguments is an obstacle for LGB
parenting, delaying, for example, the possibility of easing the plight of foster care
youth. As Sankaran and Gates’ testimonies in the DeBoer trial revealed, barriers to
LGB parenting only worsen the dire situation faced by foster youth.177 By focusing
on whether sexual orientation and gender identity can be transmitted, courts delay
the more important question: what is wrong with sexual orientation and gender
identity variance? Every delay to the resolution of that question keeps foster youth
in the foster system when they would otherwise be fostered or adopted by LGB
persons, couples, or families. In broader terms, the delay of this question keeps the
children of LGB parents unsure of the legitimacy of their own families.
This normative question about sexual orientation and gender variance is
pressing. Professor William N. Eskridge answers it with what he terms “benign
variation,” which suggests “no gender role is inevitably ‘best’ for every woman or
every man, and no sexual practice or orientation is inevitably ‘best for every
person.”178 Eskridge argues that the federal and state governments are already well
on their way to fully adopting the idea of benign variation, as evidenced by the
proliferation of antidiscrimination laws.179 From this forthcoming consensus,
Eskridge predicts, the Supreme Court will adopt the benign variation perspective
and “disable the state from insisting on heterosexuality.”180 Beyond benign
variation, Eskridge argues that sexual and gender variation should also be thought
of as productive, leading to questions such as “What messages should we be sending
the nation’s youth? What relationship forms work best for family needs?”181 These
questions will not come to the forefront of the debate until questions about the
immutability of sexual orientation, and particularly about the immutability of
parents’ sexual orientation, are disregarded.

176. Rosky, supra note 12, at 667–68.
177. Gates testified that same-sex couples are roughly twice as likely to raise a foster child than
their opposite-sex counterparts. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 3, at 31. Sankaran, a clinical
professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School in the Child Advocacy Law Clinic and the
Child Welfare Appellate Clinic, testified that eliminating barriers to both members of a same-sex couple
adopting or fostering a child by allowing the couple to marry would result in fewer children in the
adoption and foster care systems. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 2, pt. 2, at 63–65.
178. Eskridge, supra note 166, at 1341.
179. Id. at 1350.
180. Id. at 1352.
181. Id. at 1360.
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CONCLUSION
DeBoer demonstrates how anxieties about divergent sexual orientation and
gender identities evolve and become more sophisticated as legal arguments. It is
generally settled that whether sexual orientation is immutable is an unnecessary
inquiry for purposes of heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Yet
in cases involving children and parenting, the relevance of immutability seems to
reemerge, indicating that children are proxies for sexual orientation transmission
fears. Instead of giving this fear credence, lawsuits involving LGB parenting should
instead recognize and draw on the settlement of the immutability factor in level-ofscrutiny doctrine to make room for the more pressing normative debate about
benign variation of sexual orientation and gender identities.
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